Recent Developments by Thomas, Brian G.
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW-PR LEGE AGAINST SELF-INCRIMINATION DOES
NOT PREVENT COMPULSORY MENTAL EXAMINATION IN CRIMINAL SEXUAL PsY-
CHOPATHY PROCEEDING-State ex rel. Haskett v. Marion County Criminal Court,
234 N.E.2d 636 (Sup. Ct. Ind., 1968)-Indiana statutes for the determination
and commitment of criminal sexual psychopaths' provide that an alleged psycho-
pathic person is required, under penalty of contempt of court, to answer questions
propounded in a mental examination by appointed physicians.2 After Haskett
was charged with the criminal offense of 'peeping in house,' proceedings were
begun under the statute to have him determined to be a criminal sexual psycho-
path. Such determination would operate as a bar to further prosecution of the
criminal charge.3 Haskett brought an original action in the Indiana Supreme
Court to compel the lower court to strike its order requiring him "to answer all
questions put to him by physicians and each of them pursuant to statute," con-
tending that the statute and the order violated his privilege against self-incrimina-
tion.4  He apparently did not argue that disclosures compelled in the mental ex-
amination might be used in any criminal prosecution. As the court noted, the
Indiana statute provides that the report of the examining physicians "shall not be
considered to be competent evidence in any other proceeding filed against the ac-
cused except the hearing . . . into the alleged psychopathy of the accused."5' The
order to answer questions was apparently challenged as compelling disclosure of
information that could be used against the petitioner in the psychopathy hearing
itself. The Indiana Supreme Court held the privilege was not violated.
The court relied heavily on People v. English,6 which involved a similar order
under the Illinois Sexually Dangerous Persons Act.7 Since the Illinois Act pro-
vides for involuntary commitment, the English court said, some of the procedural
safeguards applicable in a criminal proceeding will apply in proceedings under
the Act. For example, the defendant has the right to confront the witnesses
against him. Nonetheless, "[slince no criminal liability is attached to the status
of a sexually dangerous person, the evil at which the privilege is aimed is not pres-
ent when the compelled examination shows no more than the existence or non-
existence of this status." 8  Since the Act did not require that incriminating state-
ments made to examining psychiatrists be excluded from any subsequent criminal
prosecutions, the English court held the defendant could not be required to answer
questions when the answers might be incriminating.9
After quoting at length from People v. English, the Haskett court held the
order was valid on two grounds. First, the proceedings under the statute were
IND. ANN. STAT. §§ 9-3401 to 9-3403 (1956), 9-3404 (Supp. 1968).
2 1d. § 9-3404(a).
3 Id. § 9-3404.
4 It does not appear from the opinion whether the privilege was claimed under state law or
federal law or both. The petitioner's brief was unavailable. Art 1, § 14 provides, "No person,
in any criminal prosecution, shall be compelled to testify against himself."
5 IND. ANN. STAT. § 9-3404(a) (Supp. 1968). However, the statute does not explicitly pro-
hibit the physicians from themselves testifying in any criminal prosecution. Thus, if the ac-
cused should be found not to be a psychopathic person, the "peeping in house" charge could be
recommenced, and the examining physicians could conceivably testify as to inculpating dis-
closures made by the defendant in the examination, even though their report would be inad-
missible.
6 31 Ill. 2d 301, 201 N.E.2d 455 (1964).
7 ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 38, §§ 105-01 to 105-12 (Smith-Hurd 1964).
8 31 Ill. 2d at 305, 201 N.E.2d at 458.
9 Id. at 307, 201 N.E.2d at 459.
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civil in nature, not criminal, while the privilege protects only against disclosure of
facts involving criminal liability.' 0 Second, compelled mental examinations of de-
fendants who plead insanity in criminal prosecutions, and admission of testimony
by examiners as to their conclusions, are not unconstitutional as compelling self-
incrimination." Therefore, even if the commitment proceedings were criminal in
nature, the privilege would not prevent the compulsory mental examination. Each
ground of decision will be separately discussed.
I. THE CIvI-CamMNAL DIsTINCTION
In addition to People v. English, there are other cases holding sexual psycho-
path commitment proceedings to be civil rather than criminal in nature,'2 and
denying the applicability of the privilege against self-incrimination on this
ground.'2 Arguments that have been advanced in support of the civil nature of
commitment under the sexual psychopath statute include the following: the stat-
ute is not contained in the Penal Code of the State;' 4 the purpose of the statute is
remedial, curative, and to protect society and not punitive;15 commitment is not
based upon commission of any criminal act but on the status of being a psycho-
path;1O commitment is based not upon conviction and sentence but is because of
the defendant's acts and condition; 17 and the statutes are merely extensions of the
laws relating to mentally incompetent persons to persons who are sexual psycho-
paths.' 8 In no instance have proceedings under a sexual psychopath commitment
statute been held criminal.' 9
A dark shadow is cast upon this unanimity of opinion by two recent decisions.
In United States ex rel. Gerchman v. Maroney,20 proceedings under Pennsylvania's
Barr-Walker Act2 ' were held invalid as denying procedural due process. Under
the Barr-Walker Act, one convicted of any of several specified offenses, if found
to constitute "a threat of bodily harm to members of the public,"22 may be sentenced
to a state institution for an indeterminate term, from one day to life, in lieu of the
sentence otherwise provided. The government argued that the proceeding was
a civil commitment for petitioner's benefit, or alternatively, a simple sentencing
10 234 N.E.2d 636, 641 (Sup. Ct. Ind. 1968).
11Id. at 643.
12 Ex parte Reddy, 105 Cal. App. 2d. 215, 233 P.2d 159 (1951); In re Moulton, 96 N.H.
370, 77 A. 2d 26 (1950). Where the requisite liability is possible in the present or some future
proceedings, the privilege may be asserted in any proceeding, regardless of its nature. See Se-
vigny v. Bums, 108 N. H. 95, 227 A.2d 775 (1967).
1a State v. Madary, 178 Neb. 383, 133 N.W.2d 583 (1965); State ex rel. Sweezer v. Green,
360 Mo. 1249, 232 S.W.2d 897 (1950); People v. Chapman, 301 Mich. 584, 4 N.W.2d 18
(1942).
14 People v. Chapman, 301 Mich. 584, 4 N.W.2d 18 (1942).
1;State ex rel. Sweezer v. Green, 360 Mo. 1249, 232 S.W.2d 897 (1950).
'6 Ex parte Keddy, 105 Cal. App. 2d. 215, 233 P.2d 159 (1951).
17 People v. Chapman, 301 Mich. 584, 4 N.W.2d 18 (1942).
IsMalone v. Overholzer, 93 F.Supp. 647 (D.D.C. 1950).
19 However, in People v. Nastasio, 19 I1. 2d 524, 529, 168 N.E.2d 728, 731 (1960), it was
said that proceedings under the Illinois Sexually Dangerous Persons Act "in fact closely resem-
ble criminal prosecutions in many critical respects." Because of this resemblance, certain pro-
visions of the Civil Practices Act were held not authorized in such proceedings. This case was
subsequently limited by People v. English.
20 355 F.2d 302 (3d Cir. 1966).
2 1 PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 19, §§ 1166-74 (Purdon, 1952).
221Id. § 1166.
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proceeding .... "23 But the court held that the post-conviction proceedings under
the Act are criminal in nature, and independent of those resulting in the convic-
tion on which they are based; 4
This criminal punishment does not lose its characteristic because the Act
goes beyond simple retribution. "It would be archaic to limit the defini-
tion of 'punishment' . . to 'retribution'." Punishment serves several
purposes; retributive, rehabilitative, deterrent and preventive. One of the
reasons society imprisons those convicted of crimes is to keep them from
inflicting future harm, but that does not make imprisonment any the less
punishment.2 5
Gerchman was held entitled, to all the procedural safeguards essential to a fair trial,
including the right to confront and cross-examine the witnesses against him.
This case was cited with approval in Specht v. Patterson,26 where the United
States Supreme Court held proceedings under a similar statute27 deficient for the
same reasons. Because an increased penalty can result from the determination that
a person constitutes a "threat of bodily harm", "invocation of the . . . Act
means the making of a new charge leading to... punishment" 28 which is "crimi-
nal punishment even though it is designed not so much as retribution as it is to
keep individuals from inflicting future harm." 29
Differences between the acts in question in Gerchman and Specht and the Indi-
ana statutes are undeniable, and should not be minimized. The Barr-Walker and
Colorado Sex Offenders Statutes require as prerequisites the conviction for certain
crimes;3 0 the Indiana statutes may be invoked where there has been no conviction,
but a charge of certain criminal conduct filed. The Barr-Walker and Colorado
Sex Offenders Statutes prescribe a maximum sentence of life imprisonment, with
release dependent on a determination by the Board of Parole;31 one found to be a
criminal sexual psychopath under the Indiana statute is committed to the State
Council for Mental Health for confinement in an appropriate state institution3-
But there are also important similarities. One is the finding of fact required.
Under the Barr-Walker Act the court must find that the person, "if at large, con-
stitutes a threat of bodily harm to members of the public, or is an habitual offender
and mentally ill;"a3 a complete psychiatric examination and submission of a writ-
ten report to the court are also required 3 4 The Colorado Sex Offenders Statute
contains the same requirements.35 The Indiana statute defines a criminal sexual
psychopath as one "over the age of sixteen (16) years who is suffering from a
23 355 F.2d at 309.
24 Id.
25Id., quoting from United States v. Brown, 381 U.S. 437, 458 (1965).
26 386 U.S. 605 (1967).
2 7 COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 39-19-1 to 39-19-10 (1963).
28 386 U.S. at 610.
29 Id. at 608-09.
30PA. STAT. ANN. ti. 19 § 1166 (Purdon 1952); COLO REV. STAT. ANN. § 39-19-1
(1963).
31 PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 19, §§ 1166, 1172 (Purdon 1952); COLO. REv. STAT. ANN. §§
39-19-1, 39-19-7 (1963).
3 2 IND. ANN. STAT. § 9-3404 (Supp. 1968).
3 3 PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 19, § 1166 (Purdon 1952).
34 Id. at § 1167.
3 5 COLO. REv. STAT. ANN. §§ 39-19-1, 39-19-2 (1963).
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mental disorder and is not insane or feebleminded which mental disorder is cou-
pled with criminal propensities to the commission of sex offenses. ... 6 The
subject's mental condition and his tendency to anti-social behavior are the major
elements in each of the required findings of fact.
One against whom the Barr-Walker Act or Colorado Sex Offender Act is in-
voked must have been convicted of a crime, whereas one against whom the Indiana
statute is invoked might not have been convicted. But this distinction is in meas-
ure offset by the fact that commitment under the Indiana statute depends on the
filing of a criminal charge and a finding of "criminal propensity to commit
crimes". These requirements arguably make the proceedings equally as crime-
related as those in Gerchman and Specht. Further, both the Barr-Walker pro-
ceedings in Gerchman and the Colorado proceedings in Specht were held to be in-
dependent of the prior convictions,37 rather than simply sentencing hearings. The
decisive factor in those decisions was not the fact of prior convictions but the pos-
sible imposition of criminal punishment. This would seem to minimize the im-
portance of differences between the statutory prerequisites.
The difference between imprisonment and confinement in a mental institution
may be an important one in theory.38 Gerchman and Specht, by stressing the
fact of confinement more than the diverse purposes to be achieved thereby, reduce
the importance of this difference. The practical difference between commitment
and imprisonment may be small indeed.3 9
It is not doubted that an insanity commitment proceeding is a civil proceed-
ing.40 And commitment under a sexual psychopath statute has been upheld as an
extension of the laws relating to insane persons and to persons with psychopathic
personalities. 4 1  But is such a commitment still dearly a civil proceeding? The
purpose of the proceeding is to effect what, in some jurisdictions, is effected by
post-conviction sentencing proceedings: the proceeding is instituted only against
those who have been charged with crime (and is thus in a sense an alternative to
prosecution), and to commit only those found to have propensities to the com-
mission of sex offenses. It is not dear that the proceeding is a civil one. Gerch-
man and Specht say nothing directly against the applicability of the privilege
against self-incrimination; but they cast great doubt on the persuasiveness of the
civil-criminal distinction as a basis for determining its applicability in this case.
II. SELF INCRIMINATION IN PRE-TRIAL EXAMINATION
For the second ground of its decision, that compelled mental examinations are
permissible in certain criminal proceedings, the court in Haskett relied on Noelke
v. State,42 and similar decisions.43 These are older cases, however, and do not
36 IND. ANN. STAT. § 9-3401 (1956).
37 355 F.2d at 309; 386 U.S. at 610.
3 8 Commonwealth v. Page, 339 Mass. 313, 159 N.X.2d 82 (1959); In re Maddox, 351 Mich.
358, 88 N.W.2d 470 (1958).
39 AmERICAN BAR FOUNDATION, MENTALLY DISABLED AND THE LAw, 306-08 (1961);
TAPPAN, REPORT OF THE NEw JEsEY Comi VssIoN ON THE HABITUAL SEx OFFENDER, 32(1950); Hacker & Frym, The Sexual Psychopath Act in Practice: A Critical Discussion, 43
CALIF. L REv. 766, 773 (1955); Tenney, Sex, Sanity, and Stupidity in Massachusetts, 42 B. U.
L. REv. 1, 19-20 (1962); Note, The Plight of the Sexual Psychopath, A Legislative Blunder and
Judicial Acquiescence, 41 NOTE DAME L. REV. 527, 552 (1956).
40Hock v. Simes, 98 N. H. 380, 98 A.2d 165 (1953); In re Brewer, 224 Iowa 773, 276
N. W. 766 (1937).
4 1 Minnesota ex rel Pearson v. Probate Court, 309 U.S. 270 (1940).
42214 Ind. 427, 15 N.E.2d 950 (1938).
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adequately reflect the current state of the law in this area. A multitude of recent
cases exhibits diverse treatment of a growing number of issues, and the jurispru-
dence must be said to be in a state of unsettlement on this question.
Although numerous cases contain language upholding court-ordered mental
examinations where defendant's sanity is an issue in a criminal prosecution,4 4 in
most of these cases, including Noelke v. State, no objection was made to appoint-
ment of physicians, or at the examination, but only at trial, to physicians' testi-
mony regarding the examination. Thus the examinations were in these cases not
compelled, and the language there supporting compelled examinations is dictum.
In State v. Myers45 this dictum is stated as a rule of law, and an order directing
the mental examination of one charged with murder was upheld against the de-
fendant's objection. In recent years a number of courts have ruled on the validity
of ordering such examinations where defendant objects, asserting his privilege
against self-incrimination. In some of these cases the privilege was held vio-
lated; 46 others have upheld the orders.47 An analysis of the reasoning in some
of these cases shows the unsettled state of the law, and the uncertainty of its im-
plications for the somewhat analogous issue in Haskett.
In French v. District Court48 defendant's privilege against self-incrimination
was held violated when the trial court struck his defense of insanity in response to
his refusal to answer questions propounded by physicans appointed to determine
his mental condition. State v. Olson49 held invalid an order requiring defendant
to submit to and cooperate in a pre-trial examination. In both French and Olson
the nature and scope of the privilege recognized is not entirely dear. The privi-
lege could be seen as permitting compelled examinations where defendant's state-
ments could affect the trial court's finding only as to his mental condition, but
not where there is danger of their influencing in any way the finding as to his
guilt or innocence. Alternatively, a broader view of the privilege as a right to re-
main silent even where speaking could adversely affect only the finding as to de-
fendant's sanity could be recognized. French and Olson hint at adoption of both
of these alternatives.50
43 Cases cited in Annot. 32 A.L.R.2d 434, 444-48 (1953). Several of the cases cited there
specifically upheld mental examinations only to the extent that they are not compelled, how-
ever. Hunt v. State, 248 Ala. 217, 27 So. 2d 186 (1946); People v. Strong, 114 Cal. App. 522,
300 P. 84 (1931).
44 Commonwealth v. Butler, 405 Pa. 36, 173 A.2d 468, cert. denied, 368 U.S. 945 (1961),
rehearing denied, 368 U.S. 972 (1962); McVeigh v. State, 73 So. 2d 694 (Sup. Ct. Fla. 1954),
app. dismissed, 348 U.S. 885 (1954); State v. Grayson, 239 N.C. 453, 80 S.E.2d 387 (1954);
Jessner v. State, 202 Wis. 184, 231 N.W. 634 (1930).
45220 S.C. 309, 67 S.E.2d 506 (1951).
46 French v. District Court, 153 Colo. 10, 384 P.2d 268 (1963); State v. Olson, 274 Minn.
225, 143 N.W.2d 69 (1966), Sheperd V. Bowe, --- Ore., 442 P.2d 238 (1968).
47 State v. Whitlow, 145 N.J. 3, 210 A.2d 763 (1965); Battle v. Cameron, 260 F.Supp. 804
(D.D.C. 1966); State ex rel. LaFoIlette v. Raskin, 34 Wis.2d 607, 150 N.W.2d 318 (1967);
United States v. Albright, 388 F.2d 719 (4th Cir. 1968).
48 153 Colo. 10, 384 P.2d 268 (1963).
49 274 Minn. 225, 143 N.W.2d 69 (1966).
50 Thus, for example, the court in Olson held that the problem of preventing statements
made by defendant to examining physicians from influencing the jury's finding on the issue of
guilt rather than solely on the issue of sanity, should be resolved by legislation. The court also
remarked, however, that the Fifth Amendment and the Minnesota Constitution "prohibit with-
out question this kind of testimonial compulsion against the defendant's will.. . the defendant
may remain silent if he chooses to do so." 274 Minn. at 231, 143 N.W.2d at 72. While the
court in French noted the danger that defendant may make incriminating statements to examin-
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The Oregon Supreme Court, on the other hand, dearly saw defendant's privi-
lege threatened only as his compelled statements threatened to have an affect on
the issue of his guilt, either by being introduced at trial, or by leading investiga-
tors to other incriminating evidence. In Phillips v. State5l the court upheld a
court-ordered mental examination in which the defendant was required to answer
questions not related to the offense charged.52 The same approach is adopted in
State v. Whitlowr- and State ex rel. LaFollette v. Raskin;54 and in the view of
these courts, adequate measures could be taken to prevent evidence obtained in
mental examinations from affecting the trial court's decision on the issue of guilt.55
Two theories which would support the view of these latter cases no longer
seem valid or widely accepted. In a few earlier cases it was said that a plea of not
guilty by reason of insanity, or even the likelihood of such a plea, constituted a
waiver of the privilege.56 This theory dearly has no relevance where, as in Has-
kett, the mental examination is required by statute and is not contingent upon any
act or plea of the defendant. A more widely accepted theory was that a mental
examination, like a physical examination, produced only non-testimonial evidence,
and so fell outside the privilege. This view finds significant support.57  It was
espoused by Wigmore, 5s in other treatises,59 in the Model Code of Evidence, 60
and in the Model Penal Code.61 Nevertheless it has met with scholarly opposition,
most cogently expressed in Danforth, Death-Knell for Pre-Trial Mental Examina-
tions? Privilege Against Self-Incrimination.61 What had been called the leading
case on the point 3 was, in effect, overruled in LaFollete:
To obtain the full benefit of compulsory examination we think it should
not be limited in scope to the observation of physical characteristics of the
subject but may encompass inquiries concerning past conduct of the accused
ing physidans which could be introduced at trial with possible prejudicial influence on the
finding as to his guilt, at the same time it seemed to recognize a broader right to remain silent,
when it said, "A person accused of a crime who enters a plea of not guilty by reason of insanity,
cannot be compelled to carry on conversations against his will under the penalty of forfeiture of
the defense for failure to respond to questions...." 153 Colo. at 14, 384 P.2d at 270.
51 245 Ore. 466, 422 P.2d 670 (1967).
52 Sheperd v. Bowe, - Ore. -, 442 P.2d 238 (1968), decided after Haskett, reaf-
firmed Phillips, but held that defendant could not be ordered to answer questions when to do so
might incriminate him, and the court may not order defendant's lawyer not to advise him not
to answer incriminating questions.
53 145 N.J. 3, 210 A.2d 763 (1965).
54 34 Wis. 2d 607, 150 N.W.2d 318 (1967).
M In Whitlow this was done by not permitting questions related to the alleged crime, un-
less necessary, and instructing the jury to disregard evidence obtained in the mental examination
except on the issue of defendant's sanity. In LaFollette, it was done through a sequential order
of proof in a single trial.
56 People v. Castro, 140 Colo. 493, 346 P.2d 1020 (1959); State v. Swinburne, 324 S.W.2d
746 (Sup. Ct. Mo. 1959); People v. Esposito, 257 N.Y. 389, 39 N.E.2d 925 (1942).
57 Battle v. Cameron, 260 F. Supp. 804 (D.D.C. 1966); State v. Grayson, 239 N.C. 453,
80 S.E.2d 387 (1954); State v. Myers, 220 S.C. 309, 67 S.E.2d 506 (1951); Jessner v. State, 202
Wis. 184, 231 N.W. 634 (1930).
58 8 WIGholE, EVIDENcE § 2265 (McNaughton rev. ed., 1961).
59 1 GREENLEAF, EVIENC:E 616 (16th ed. 1899); McCoRMIcK, EvImENCE 266 (1954).
60 MODEL CODE OF EVIDENCE rule 25, Comment (1942).
@1 MODEL PENAL CODE § 4.05, Comment (Tent Draft No. 5, 1966).
62 19 RUTGERS L J. 489, 499 (1965). See also sources cited note 66 infra.
63 Jessner v. State, 202 Wis. 184, 231 N.W. 634 (1930), so called in a comment in the
Model Penal Code, cited note 61 supra.
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and requires testimonial response to questions which would be within the
privilege against self-incrimination. 64
If all evidence obtained in a mental examination were truly non-testimonial
in character, the privilege would not apply to prevent its use directly on the issue
of guilt. Yet Whitlow, LaFollette, Myers, and other cases recognize that confes-
sions or other inculpatory statements made in the course of the compulsory exam-
ination may be admitted only on the issue of sanity. They reject the theory to
that extent. Yet if such utterances are testimonial with respect to the issue of
guilt, are they not testimonial with respect to the issue of sanity? The psychiatrist
certainly relies upon the information given him by the examinee6 5 in forming his
condusions.
Two supporting theories have been used to justify compelled cooperation in
mental examinations. First, though there is testimonial compulsion, there is no
threat of incriminating where the evidence obtained will be admissible only as to
the sanity of the defendant.6 6 The issue of sanity is independent of the issue of
guilt it is argued. Clearly, however, the issues are not independent. The defend-
ant's mental condition at the time of the crime is material only insofar as it bears
upon his guilt or innocence of the crime, either through the defense of insanity or
through the requisite mens rea as an element of the offense.
The second argument is that of expediency. The consequences of the privi-
lege for pre-trial mental examinations have been avoided, except in French and
Olson, by stressing an ideal of fairness, the right of the government, when defend-
ant pleads insanity, and especially where the burden of proving competence is on
the state, to have equal access to evidence bearing on that issue. The gist of this
argument is that, unless the privilege is held inapplicable, justice is likely to be
defeated.
In United States v. Albright67 the defendant's privilege was defeated by an
ideal of fairness found by the court in the privilege itself. Defendant's com-
pelled statements to the psychiatrist in a court-ordered mental examination were
held admissible at trial. On the basis of language in Miranda v. Arizona68 the
court held that the underlying purposes of the privilege were served by upholding
the compelled mental examination. Where the accused seeks to defend on the ba-
sis of insanity, the required mental examination "maintains the fair state-individ-
ual balance" 69 by allowing the government equal access to the only reliable means
of ascertaining the truth. Moreover, "the inviolability of the human personality"
demands that the issue be determined on the most reliable evidence available. 70
This is at least a novel interpretation of the privilege. While placing great im-
portance on some phrases in Miranda, it completely ignores much else in that
opinion that indicates that the privilege is not meant to be fair to the government,
64 34 Wis. 2d at 622, 150 N.W.2d at 326.
65 Danforth, Death-Knell for Pre-Trial Mental Fxaminations? Privilege Against Self In-
crimination., 19 RUT(GHRs L. J. 487, 497 (1965).
66 Id. at 497, 498; Krash, The Durham Rule and Judicial Administration of the Insanity
Defense in the District of Columbia, 70 YALE L. J. 905, 920 (1961); Comment, Compulsory
Mental Examinations and the Privilege Against Self-Incrimination, 1964 Wis. L REv. 671,
678; Note, Pretrial Mental Examination and Commitment: Some Procedural Problems in the
District of Columbia, 51 GEO. L. J. 143, 151.
67 388 F.2d 719 (4th Cir. 1968) This case was decided after Haskett.
68 384 U.S. 436 (1966).
69 388 F.2d at 724.
70 Id. at 725.
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but rather to weigh the balance in favor of the individual. 71 Perhaps it may be
expedient to deny availability of the privilege in certain instances. It is not pos-
sible to do so consistently with the present theory of the privilege, as set out in
Miranda.
Strictly, the privilege should be made available to prevent compelled conversa-
tions with examining psychiatrists in criminal prosecutions where the defendant
pleads insanity. In most cases this has not been done; restrictions have been placed
on the use of the evidence obtained. But the theories on which this approach has
been predicated do not apply to the proceedings in Haskett. There the defen-
dant's mental condition is dearly not a separate, collateral issue, but the main is-
sue. Nor is it an issue raised by the defendant, which it would be unfair to deny
the government the opportunity to rebut. There is much less reason, therefore, to
refuse an assertion of the privilege.
III. CONCLUSION
The Hasket court bases its decision on two grounds. First, the privilege
against self-incrimination protects against potential criminal liability, but the In-
diana sexual psychopath proceeding involves no such liability; and second, even
in criminal prosecutions, compelled mental examinations have been upheld as not
violating the privilege. Neither of these arguments is persuasive. The second is
an inaccurate summary of the case law, and not relevant to psychopath proceedings,
where the defendant's mental condition is not a merely collateral issue. The
first argument is an application of labels which conceal rather than reflect the
realities.
Under the Indiana statutes one stands to be deprived of one's liberty, indefi-
nitely, as a result of having been charged with crime and determined to have crimi-
nal propensities to commit sex offenses. The policy of the privilege against self-
incrimination, according to Miranda, is to require the government "to shoulder the
entire load," to produce the evidence against a defendant by its own independent
labors rather than by the cruel, simple expedient of compelling it from his own
mouth.72 This policy should apply where the government seeks to confine a per-
son by proving a criminal propensity as well as where it seeks to confine a person
by proving the actual commission of a crime.
Implicit in decisions like Haskett is the fear that availability of the privilege in
sexual psychopath proceedings might largely defeat operation of the statutes. This
should be an irrelevant consideration. It may be noted, however, that the stat-
utes have long been criticized as unnecessary, ineffective, and subject to abuse, and
their passing should not be cause for dismay. It is unfortunate that in Haskett
the Indiana Supreme Court upheld the statutes instead of the privilege.
Brian G. Thomas
71 384 U.S. at 460.
72 Id.
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